After launching what he known as “a strong and lethal strike towards ISIS [ISIL] terrorist scum” in northwest Nigeria on December 25, United States President Donald Trump promised “many extra”, reaffirming his stance that the US “is not going to enable radical Islamic terrorism to prosper”. The strikes occurred lower than per week after the newly fashioned Alliance of Sahel States (AES) commissioned a joint navy drive comprising a 5,000-strong contingent, introduced as a logo of collective self-reliance and safety autonomy, in a concerted effort to fight terrorist teams in its member states. In addition they adopted strikes by the Financial Group of West African States (ECOWAS) to determine an bold plan introduced in August 2025 to activate a 260,000-strong joint counterterrorism drive, backed by a proposed $2.5bn annual price range for logistics and front-line help.
Whereas these developments could also be introduced by their proponents as decisive steps towards terrorism, there’s little proof that militarised escalation alone can defeat armed teams within the Sahel. As a substitute, they sign an accelerating militarisation of the area. Not solely does this gas rising geopolitical tensions in West Africa, but it surely additionally, extra importantly, edges the Sahel in direction of interstate armed battle, posing far graver dangers to regional peace and stability.
A friendship turned bitter
Till 2021, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations within the Sahel had been ruled by a loosely coordinated, non-hierarchical safety structure constructed round diplomatic and navy collaboration amongst regional and extra-regional actors. This structure introduced collectively ECOWAS, the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, exterior powers such because the US and France, in addition to regional powers equivalent to Algeria and Nigeria, with ECOWAS taking part in a central coordinating function.
A typical instance was the 2013 African-led Worldwide Assist Mission to Mali, organised by ECOWAS in collaboration with the AU, UN and France to confront Tuareg rebels and allied armed teams in northern Mali. Extra distinguished was the EU-financed G5 Sahel counterterrorism drive, which introduced collectively African and European troops and operated between 2017 and 2023. Whereas these preparations had been typically marked by rigidity, competitors and uneven outcomes, they functioned inside a shared safety framework that restricted direct confrontation between states.
This steadiness was disrupted after the 2023 coup in Niger. By threatening using drive to revive constitutional order, ECOWAS crossed a political threshold that remodeled its function from middleman to perceived adversary within the eyes of the Nigerien junta. That menace was broadly interpreted as an act of aggression, and it proved catalytic. In response, Niger’s navy rulers, alongside their counterparts in Mali and Burkina Faso, moved to determine the Alliance of Sahel States as a deliberate effort to reclaim safety autonomy, dismantle the prevailing multilateral safety regime and sever ties with longstanding companions together with ECOWAS, the EU, the US and France.
Notably, the AES institutionalises a mutual defence pact that codifies this break with the earlier multilateral safety order by explicitly framing ECOWAS and its Western companions as threats to the sovereignty and nationwide safety of its member states. Past deepening the rift between former allies, this posture indicators a harmful shift in direction of the securitisation of neighbouring states, elevating the spectre of interstate battle in West Africa, a phenomenon largely absent because the Nineties.
Rising geopolitical tensions
In severing safety ties with the West, the AES have pivoted in direction of Russia as a principal safety companion to counterbalance many years of US and European affect in West Africa, signalling a deepening however nonetheless evolving safety partnership with Moscow. Whereas these strategic decisions mirror an rising self-help posture with new preferences for non-conventional allies, they’re additionally intensifying geopolitical tensions throughout the area.
Nigeria’s navy function in countering an tried coup in neighbouring Benin was praised as a serious win for ECOWAS. However when a Nigerian Air Power C-130 plane made an emergency touchdown in Burkina Faso two days later, the AES interpreted this as a violation of its airspace and sovereignty, authorising its air drive to neutralise any plane concerned in additional violations. Tensions had been heightened by reviews that France had offered Nigeria with surveillance and intelligence help throughout the Benin intervention, fuelling apprehension about France’s potential re-entry into the AES safety panorama. With Nigeria now prepared to increase safety cooperation with the US following the Christmas Day strikes, the stakes have risen additional for the AES. Though geared toward militants working in northwest Nigeria, the strikes seem calculated to bolster US strategic legitimacy as a counterterrorism actor within the area, doubtlessly opening the door to additional operations in Nigeria’s northeast, the place ISWAP and Boko Haram stay energetic.
Given Nigeria’s affect inside ECOWAS, this rising safety partnership with the US is more likely to form the operational capability of the proposed 260,000-strong ECOWAS drive. This doesn’t bode properly for the AES, which is intent on insulating its member states from Western safety affect within the title of sovereignty. As a result of ECOWAS forces can be deployed in member states on the epicentre of terrorist violence, many fight engagements would happen in places adjoining to AES territories. With AES troops additionally working in these areas, navy clashes between the 2 sides turn out to be more and more doubtless, significantly given the area’s porous borders and fluid fight environments. Provided that the Christmas Day strikes reportedly hit unintended targets, the danger that future air strikes by a US-backed ECOWAS may spill into AES territory can’t be dismissed. For deterrence, the AES might search to leverage Russia’s navy backing, evoking echoes of Chilly Battle-era safety brinkmanship.
Implications for regional stability
With out reconciliation between the AES and ECOWAS, two main dangers loom for regional peace and stability. First, rising geopolitical tensions may draw AES and ECOWAS member states into direct interstate navy confrontations, doubtlessly plunging West Africa right into a regional warfare. Such a battle would serve neither facet’s counterterrorism targets. Past devastating the area, it will create house for armed teams to increase their operations amid fractured and distracted safety responses. Second, the standoff dangers turning West Africa into a brand new theatre for international energy rivalry, with a Russia-backed AES on one facet and a US and France-backed ECOWAS on the opposite. Within the context of an rising New Chilly Battle, using veto energy by these international actors on the UN Safety Council may additional complicate battle decision, with profoundly destabilising penalties for the area.
The AES and ECOWAS now face a stark alternative: to revive Chilly Battle-style bloc politics in West Africa whereas the area slides in direction of chaos, or to barter a safety sub-coalition that prioritises human safety alongside nationwide sovereignty. No matter how the AES views ECOWAS, the burden lies with the latter to handle the unintended penalties of escalating tensions. Whereas there are few indications that the AES is prepared to cooperate immediately with a West-backed ECOWAS on counterterrorism, ECOWAS may pursue diplomatic engagement to barter an idea of operations that ensures respect for AES sovereignty. As Africa’s most skilled regional safety organisation, ECOWAS possesses the diplomatic capability to take action. For progress to be made, Francophone ECOWAS member states ought to take the lead in these efforts, whereas Nigeria workout routines its affect extra discreetly. Whether or not ECOWAS can reclaim possession of its safety agenda and outline the phrases of exterior engagement will form not solely West Africa’s future, however that of the continent as an entire.
The views expressed on this article are the writer’s personal and don’t essentially mirror Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
